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Quantum Cryptography with Orthogonal States?
In a recent Letter [1], Goldenberg and Vaidman (GV) propose a new quantum crypto-
graphical protocol “based on orthogonal states,” and claim that it is essentially different
from all existing quantum cryptosystems, which use non-orthogonal states as the carriers
of information. This claim is unfounded: in the oldest protocol [2], known as BB84,
the information sender (Alice) uses two orthogonal states, in a basis of her choice, for
representing the values 0 and 1 of a bit. However, when a photon reaches the receiver
(Bob), the latter does not know the basis used by Alice. He can in principle store that
photon and wait until Alice publicly discloses her basis (in practice, it is easier to test the
photon in a randomly chosen basis, and later to discard the corresponding bit, if it was
tested with the wrong basis). An eavesdropper (Eve) has no such option of waiting, or
discarding wrong choices. From her point of view, there are four possible states, not all
orthogonal. She cannot acquire any information without a risk of perturbing these states.
Only with the help of a time machine could eavesdropping be done with impunity.
The GV protocol has quite similar features. The process is represented in Fig. 1 as a
spacetime diagram, for more clarity. This figure differs from the one in ref. [1], where the
storage rings SR1 and SR2 were drawn very small, while actually they are longer than
the distance from Alice to Bob. Here, to avoid such a scale distortion, I represented the
storage rings by zigzag lines (as if, instead of coiled optical fibers, there were mirrors
between which the photons bounced many times). Alice uses two different input ports
(two orthogonal states) in order to materialize bit values 0 and 1, and Bob likewise
detects them as othogonal states. On the other hand, the states accessible to Eve are not
orthogonal, just as in the BB84 protocol. With the standard notations of quantum optics,
the quantum state between the two beamsplitters is |ψ±〉 = 2
−1/2 ( |0〉 |1〉±|1〉 |0〉 ), where
the first and second kets refer to the two branches of the interferometer, and the ± sign
corresponds to bit values 0 and 1, respectively. These two orthogonal states may also be
represented by density matrices, ρ± = |ψ±〉 〈ψ±|.
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As seen in the figure, Eve can access the information carrier only in two time windows,
and in each one of them she controls just one branch of the interferometer. If Eve is
restricted to performing only instantaneous measurements, the other branch of the inter-
ferometer is not accessible to her. The results of an instantaneous measurement in a single
branch are then obtained by “tracing out” the other branch in ρ±. This gives a reduced
density matrix, ρ′
±
= 1
2
( |0〉 〈0| + |1〉 〈1| ), which is the same for both branches, and also
the same for bit values 0 and 1. The ρ′
±
states, as seen by Eve, are not orthogonal. They
are identical . The meaning of ρ′
±
is that Eve has a 50% chance of getting the vacuum, or
getting one particle.
If, on the other hand, Eve is not restricted to instantaneous measurements, she can use
an apparatus similar to Bob’s, with a delay line, and then she can identify the states |ψ±〉
with certainty. However, the resulting delay is observable by Bob, exactly as it would be
in the BB84 protocol if Eve stored the message carriers until after Alice announced the
basis she used. Moreover, as shown by GV, it is essential that Alice announces the exact
time of emission of each photon only after the latter was received by Bob. Otherwise, Eve
could successfully eavesdrop by introducing a dummy particle.
In summary, the GV protocol has many features similar to those of BB84. From the
point of view of Alice, each bit has its value represented by one of two orthogonal states,
but it must be accompanied by delayed information: namely, the basis chosen by Alice,
or the exact time of emission (the delayed information may be either classical, or encoded
into orthogonal quantum states of additional photons).
Moreover, it is possible to imagine other protocols, interpolating between those of GV
and BB84. Their common feature is that information is sent in two consecutive steps,
and security is achieved by withholding the second piece of information until after Bob
receives the first one, and Eve can no longer access it. For example, Alice could publicly
declare when she sends a photon, and, instead of using two different bases as in BB84,
she would use two identical GV interferometers, and disclose her choice only at a later
time. A general theory of eavesdropping on two-step quantum protocols is an interesting
problem, worth being investigated in more detail.
GV also propose a “relativistic” version of their protocol, with widely separated paths
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instead of a time delay. This method is not secure: a team of eavesdroppers could use
mirrors to redirect the photon paths toward a common inspection center, and thence to
Bob, without arousing suspicion.
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Caption of figure
FIG. 1. The photon carrying the information is split into two wave packets, moving with
velocity c. Eve, restricted to x ≃ 0, can test at most one branch of its wave function at
any time (in one of the shaded areas).
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